LDP (Local Differential Privacy) has recently attracted much attention as a privacy metric in the local model, in which individual users obfuscate their own personal data by themselves, and the data collector estimates statistics of the personal data, such as a distribution underlying the data. Although LDP does not require users to trust the data collector, it regards all personal data equally sensitive, which causes excessive obfuscation hence the loss of data utility.
INTRODUCTION
DP (Differential Privacy) [18, 19] is becoming a gold standard for data privacy; it enables big data analysis while protecting users' privacy against adversaries with arbitrary background knowledge. According to the underlying architecture, DP can be categorized into the one in the centralized model and the one in the local model [19] . In the centralized model, a "trusted" database administrator, who can access to all users' personal data, obfuscates the data (e.g., by adding noise, generalization) before providing them to a (possibly malicious) data analyst. Although DP was extensively studied for the centralized model at the beginning, all of the original personal data in this model can be leaked from the database by illegal access or internal fraud. This issue is critical in recent years, because the number of data breach incidents is increasing [12] .
The local model does not require a "trusted" administrator, and therefore does not suffer from the data leakage issue explained above. In this model, each user obfuscates her personal data by herself, and sends the obfuscated data to a data collector (or data analyst). Based on the obfuscated data, the data collector can estimate some statistics (e.g., histogram, heavy hitters [37] ) of the personal data. DP in the local model, which is called LDP (Local Differential Privacy) [16] , has recently attracted much attention in the academic field [10, 24, 25, 33, 35, 37, 38, 44, 52] , and has also been adopted by industrial companies [13, 41, 43] .
However, LDP mechanisms regard all personal data as equally sensitive, and leave a lot of room for increasing data utility. For example, consider questionnaires such as: "Have you ever cheated in an exam?" and "Were you with a prostitute in the last month?" [9] . Obviously, "Yes" is a sensitive response to these questionnaires, whereas "No" is not sensitive. A RR (Randomized Response) method proposed by Mangat [31] utilizes this fact. Specifically, it reports "Yes" or "No" as follows: if the true answer is "Yes", always report "Yes"; otherwise, report "Yes" and "No" with probability p and 1 − p, respectively. Since the reported answer "Yes" may come from both the true answers "Yes" and "No", the confidentiality of the user reporting "Yes" is not violated. Moreover, since the reported answer "No" is always come from the true answer "No", the data collector can estimate a distribution of true answers with higher accuracy than Warner's RR [47] , which simply flips "Yes" and "No" with probability p. However, Mangat's RR does not provide LDP, since LDP regards both "Yes" and "No" as equally sensitive.
There are a lot of "non-sensitive" data for other types of data. For example, locations such as hospitals and home can be sensitive, whereas visited sightseeing places, restaurants, and coffee shops are non-sensitive for many users. Divorced people may want to keep their divorce secret, while the others may not care about their marital status. The distinction between sensitive and non-sensitive data can also be different from user to user (e.g., home address is different from user to user; some people might want to keep secret even the sightseeing places). To explain more about this issue, we briefly review related work on LDP and variants of DP.
Related work. Since Dwork [18] introduced DP, a number 1 of its variants have been studied to provide different types of privacy guarantees; e.g., LDP [16] , Pufferfish privacy [27] , dprivacy [7] , Bayesian DP [49] , mutual-information DP [11] , Rényi DP [32] , and distribution privacy [26] . In particular, LDP [16] has been widely studied in the literature. For example, Erlingsson et al. [43] proposed the RAPPOR as an obfuscation mechanism providing LDP, and implemented it in Google Chrome browser. Kairouz et al. [24] showed that under the l1 and l2 losses, the randomized response (generalized to multiple alphabets) and RAPPOR are order optimal among all LDP mechanisms in the low and high privacy regimes, respectively. Wang et al. [45] generalized the RAP-POR and a random projection-based method [5] , and found parameters that minimize the variance of the estimate.
Some studies also attempted to address the non-uniformity of privacy requirements among records (rows) or among items (columns) in the centralized DP: Personalized DP [23] , Heterogeneous DP [3] , and One-sided DP [14] . However, obfuscation mechanisms that address the non-uniformity among input values in the "local" DP have not been studied, to our knowledge. In this paper, we show that data utility can be significantly increased by designing such local mechanisms.
Our contributions. The goal of this paper is to design obfuscation mechanisms in the local model that achieve high data utility while providing DP for sensitive data. To achieve this, we introduce the notion of RLDP (Restricted LDP), which provides a privacy guarantee equivalent to LDP only for sensitive data, and obfuscation mechanisms providing RLDP. As a task for the data collector, we consider discrete distribution estimation [2, 22, 24, 38, 43, 52] , where personal data take discrete values. Our contributions are as follows:
• We first consider the setting in which all users use the same obfuscation mechanism, and propose two RLDP mechanisms: restricted RR and restricted RAPPOR. We prove that when there are a lot of non-sensitive data, our mechanisms provide much higher utility than two state-of-the-art LDP mechanisms: the RR (for multiple alphabets) [24, 25] and RAPPOR [43] . We also prove that when most of the data are non-sensitive, our mechanisms provide almost the same utility as a non-private mechanism that does not obfuscate the personal data in the low privacy regime where the privacy budget is ǫ = ln |X | for a set X of personal data.
• We then consider the setting in which the distinction between sensitive and non-sensitive data can be different from user to user, and propose a PRM (Personalized Restricted Mechanism) with semantic tags. The proposed PRM keeps secret what is sensitive for each user, while enabling the data collector to estimate a distribution using some background knowledge about the distribution conditioned on each tag (e.g., geographic distributions of homes and workplaces). We also theoretically analyze the data utility of the PRM.
• We finally show that our mechanisms are very promising in terms of utility using two large-scale datasets.
PRELIMINARIES

Notations
Let R ≥0 be the set of non-negative real numbers. Let n be the number of users, X (resp. Y) be a finite set of personal (resp. obfuscated) data. We assume continuous data are discretized into bins in advance (e.g., a location map is divided into some regions). In this paper, we use the superscript "(i)" to represent the i-th user. Let X (i) (resp. Y (i) ) be a random variable representing personal (resp. obfuscated) data of the i-th user. The i-th user obfuscates her personal data X (i) via her obfuscation mechanism Q (i) , which maps x ∈ X to y ∈ Y with probability Q (i) (y|x), and sends the obfuscated data Y (i) to a data collector. Here we assume that each user sends only a single data. We discuss the case where each user sends multiple data in Section 7.
We divide personal data into two types: sensitive data and non-sensitive data. Let XS ⊆ X be a set of sensitive data common to all users, and XN = X \ XS be the remaining personal data. Examples of such "common" sensitive data x ∈ XS are the regions including public sensitive locations (e.g., hospitals) and obviously sensitive responses to questionnaires described in Section 1 1 .
Furthermore, let X (i) S ⊆ XN (1 ≤ i ≤ n) be a set of sensitive data specific to the i-th user (here we do not include XS into X (i) S because XS is protected for all users in our mechanisms). X (i) S is a set of personal data that is possibly non-sensitive for many users but sensitive for the i-th user. Examples of such "user-specific" sensitive data x ∈ X (i) S are the regions including private locations such as their home and workplace. (Note that the majority of the U.S. working population can be uniquely identified from their home/workplace location pairs [20] .)
In Sections 3 and 4, we consider the case where all users divide X into the same sets of sensitive data and of nonsensitive data, i.e., X (1) S = · · · = X (n) S = ∅, and use the same obfuscation mechanism Q (i.e., Q = Q (1) = · · · = Q (n) ). In Section 5, we consider a general setting that can deal with the user-specific sensitive data X (i) S and user-specific mechanisms Q (i) . We call the former case a common-mechanism scenario and the latter a personalized-mechanism scenario.
We assume that each user's personal data X (i) is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with a probability distribution p, which generates x ∈ X with probability p(x). This is a reasonable assumption for a variety of personal data (e.g., locations, age, sex, marital status), where each user's data is irrelevant to most others' one. However, for some types of personal data (e.g., flu status [40] ), each user can be highly influenced by others. We discuss the case where there exists such a correlation among users in Section 7.
Let X = (X (1) , · · · , X (n) ) and Y = (Y (1) , · · · , Y (n) ) be tuples of all personal data and all obfuscated data, respectively. The data collector estimates p from Y by a method described in Section 2.5. We denote byp the estimate of p. We further denote by C the probability simplex; i.e., C = {p| x∈X p(x) = 1, p(x) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ X }.
In Appendix A, we show the basic notations in Table 2 .
Privacy Metrics
LDP (Local Differential Privacy) [16] is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (ǫ-LDP). Let ǫ ∈ R ≥0 . An obfuscation mechanism Q provides ǫ-LDP if for any x, x ′ ∈ X and any y ∈ Y, Q(y|x) ≤ e ǫ Q(y|x ′ ). (1) LDP guarantees that an adversary who has observed y cannot determine, for any pair of x and x ′ , whether it is come from x or x ′ with a certain degree of confidence. As the privacy budget ǫ approaches to 0, all of the data in X become almost equally likely. Thus, a user's privacy is strongly protected when ǫ is small.
Utility Metrics
In this paper, we use the l1 loss (i.e., absolute error) and the l2 loss (i.e., squared error) as utility metrics. Let l1 (resp. l 2 2 ) be the l1 (resp. l2) loss function, which maps the estimatep and the true distribution p to the loss; i.e., l1(p, p) = x∈X |p(x) − p(x)|, l 2 2 (p, p) = x∈X (p(x) − p(x)) 2 . It should be noted that X is generated from p and Y is generated from X using Q (1) , · · · , Q (n) . Sincep is computed from Y , both the l1 and l2 losses depend on Y .
In our theoretical analysis in Sections 4 and 5, we take the expectation of the l1 loss over all possible realizations of Y . In our experiments in Section 6, we replace the expectation of the l1 loss with the sample mean over multiple realizations of Y and divide it by 2 to evaluate the TV (Total Variation). In Appendix D, we also show that the l2 loss has similar results to the ones in Sections 4 and 6 by evaluating the expectation of the l2 loss and the MSE (Mean Squared Error), respectively (we show some main results of the MSE in Section 6).
Obfuscation Mechanisms
We describe the RR (Randomized Response) [24, 25] and a generalized version of the RAPPOR [45] as follows.
Randomized response. The RR for |X |-ary alphabets was studied in [24, 25] . Its output range is identical to the input domain; i.e., X = Y.
Formally, given ǫ ∈ R ≥0 , the ǫ-RR is an obfuscation mechanism that maps x to y with the probability:
It is easy to check by (1) and (2) that QRR provides ǫ-LDP.
Generalized RAPPOR. The RAPPOR (Randomized Aggregatable Pri-vacy-Preserving Ordinal Response) [43] is an obfuscation mechanism implemented in Google Chrome browser. Wang et al. [45] extended its simplest configuration called the basic one-time RAPPOR by generalizing two probabilities in perturbation. Here we call it the generalized RAPPOR and describe its algorithm in detail. The generalized RAPPOR is an obfuscation mechanism with the input alphabet X = {x1, x2, · · · , x |X | } and the output alphabet Y = {0, 1} |X | . It first deterministically maps xi ∈ X to ei ∈ {0, 1} |X | , where ei is the i-th standard basis vector. It then probabilistically flips each bit of ei to obtain obfuscated data y = (y1, y2, · · · , y |X | ) ∈ {0, 1} |X | , where yi ∈ {0, 1} is the i-th element of y. Wang et al. [45] compute ǫ from two parameters θ ∈ [0, 1] (representing the probability of keeping 1 unchanged) and ψ ∈ [0, 1] (representing the probability of flipping 0 into 1). In this paper, we compute ψ from two parameters θ and ǫ.
Specifically, given θ ∈ [0, 1] and ǫ ∈ R ≥0 , the (θ, ǫ)generalized RAPPOR maps xi to y with the probability:
where Pr(yj|xi) = θ if i = j and yj = 1, and Pr(yj|xi) = 1 − θ if i = j and yj = 0, and Pr(yj|xi) = ψ = θ (1−θ)e ǫ +θ if i = j and yj = 1, and Pr(yj|xi) = 1−ψ otherwise. The basic one-time RAPPOR [43] is a special case of the generalized RAPPOR where θ = e ǫ/2 e ǫ/2 +1 . QRAP also provides ǫ-LDP.
Distribution Estimation Methods
Here we explain the empirical estimation method [2, 22, 24] and the EM reconstruction method [1, 2] . Both of them assume that the data collector knows the obfuscation mechanism Q used to generate Y from X.
Empirical estimation method. The empirical estimation method [2, 22, 24] computes an empirical estimatep of p using an empirical distributionm of the obfuscated data Y . Note thatp,m, and Q can be represented as an |X |dimensional vector, |Y|-dimensional vector, and |X | × |Y| matrix, respectively. They have the following equation:
The empirical estimation method computesp by solving (3). As the number of users n increases, the empirical distributionm converges to the true distribution m. Therefore, the empirical estimatep also converges to p. However, when the number of users n is small, many elements inp can be negative. To address this issue, the studies in [43, 45] kept only estimates above a significance threshold determined via Bonferroni correction, and discarded the remaining estimates.
EM reconstruction method. The EM (Expectation-Maximization) reconstruction method [1, 2] (also called the iterative Bayesian technique [2] ) regards X as a hidden variable and estimates p from Y using the EM algorithm [21] (for details of the algorithm, see [1, 2] ). LetpEM be an estimate of p by the EM reconstruction method. The feature of this algorithm is thatpEM is equal to the maximum likelihood estimate in the probability simplex C (see [1] for the proof). Since this property holds irrespective of the number of users n, the elements inpEM are always non-negative.
In this paper, our theoretical analysis uses the empirical estimation method for simplicity, while our experiments use the empirical estimation method, the one with the significance threshold, and the EM reconstruction method.
RESTRICTED LDP (RLDP)
In this section, we focus on the common-mechanism scenario (outlined in Section 2.1) and introduce RLDP (Restricted Local Differential Privacy), which provides a privacy guarantee equivalent to ǫ-LDP only for sensitive data. Section 3.1 provides the definition of RLDP. Section 3.2 shows some theoretical properties of RLDP. Section 3.3 considers OSLDP (One-sided LDP), a local model version of version of OSDP (One-sided DP) [14] , as another privacy metric, and compares RLDP with OSLDP. Figure 1 shows an overview of RLDP. An obfuscation mechanism providing RLDP, which we call the restricted mechanism, divides obfuscated data into sensitive obfuscated data and non-sensitive obfuscated data. Let YS be a set of sensitive obfuscated data, and YN = Y \ YS be a set of nonsensitive obfuscated data. We collectively call XS and YS the sensitive sets.
Definition
The feature of the restricted mechanism is that it maps sensitive data x ∈ XS to only sensitive obfuscated data y ∈ YS. In other words, it restricts the output set, given the input x ∈ XS, to YS. Then it provides ǫ-LDP for YS; i.e., Q(y|x) ≤ e ǫ Q(y|x ′ ) for any x, x ′ ∈ X and any y ∈ YS. By this property, a privacy guarantee equivalent to ǫ-LDP is provided for any sensitive data x ∈ XS, since the output set corresponding to XS is restricted to YS.
We now define RLDP and the restricted mechanism:
Definition 2 ((XS, YS, ǫ)-RLDP). Given XS ⊆ X , YS ⊆ Y, and ǫ ∈ R ≥0 , an obfuscation mechanism Q provides (XS, YS, ǫ)-RLDP if it satisfies the following properties:
1. For any x ∈ XS and any y ∈ YN ,
2. For any x, x ′ ∈ X and any y ∈ YS,
We refer to an obfuscation mechanism Q providing (XS, YS, ǫ)-RLDP as the (XS, YS, ǫ)-restricted mechanism.
Example. For an intuitive understanding of Definition 2, we show that Mangat's randomized response [31] provides (XS, YS, ǫ)-RLDP. As described in Section 1, this mechanism considers binary alphabets (i.e., X = Y = {0, 1}), and regards the value 1 as sensitive (i.e., XS = YS = {1}). If the input value is 1, it always reports 1 as output. Otherwise, it reports 1 and 0 with probability p and 1 − p, respectively. Obviously, this mechanism does not provide ǫ-LDP for any ǫ ∈ [0, ∞). However, it provides (XS, YS, ln 1 p )-RLDP. (XS, YS, ǫ)-RLDP provides a privacy guarantee equivalent to ǫ-LDP for any sensitive data x ∈ XS, as explained above. On the other hand, no privacy guarantees are provided for non-sensitive data x ∈ XN because there are no transitions from XS to YN . However, it does not matter since nonsensitive data need not be protected. Protecting only minimum necessary data is the key to achieving locally private distribution estimation with high data utility.
We can use any ǫ-LDP mechanism in the sensitive sets XS and YS to provide (XS, YS, ǫ)-RLDP as a whole. In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we propose a restricted RR (Randomized Response) and restricted RAPPOR, which use the ǫ-RR and ǫ-RAPPOR, respectively, in the sensitive sets XS and YS.
Remark. It should also be noted that the data collector needs to know Q to estimate p from Y (as described in Section 2.5), and that the (XS, YS, ǫ)-restricted mechanism Q itself includes the information on what is sensitive for users (i.e., the data collector learns whether each x ∈ X belongs to XS or not by checking the values of Q(y|x) for all y ∈ Y). This does not matter in the common-mechanism scenario, since the set XS of sensitive data is common to all users (e.g., public hospitals). However, in the personalized-mechanism scenario, the (XS ∪ X (i) S , YS, ǫ)-restricted mechanism Q (i) , which expands the set XS of personal data to XS ∪ X (i) S , includes the information on what is sensitive for the i-th user. Therefore, the data collector learns whether each x ∈ XN belongs to X (i) S or not by checking the values of Q (i) (y|x) for all y ∈ Y, despite the fact that the i-th user wants to hide her user-specific sensitive data X (i) S (e.g., home, workplace). We address this issue in Section 5.
Basic Properties of RLDP
Previous work shown some basic properties of differential privacy (or its variant), such as compositionality [19] and immunity to post-processing [19] . We briefly explain theoretical properties of RLDP including the ones above.
Sequential composition. RLDP is preserved under adaptive sequential composition when the composed obfuscation mechanism maps sensitive data to pairs of sensitive obfuscated data. Specifically, consider two mechanisms Q0 from X to Y0 and Q1 from X to Y1 such that Q0 (resp. Q1) maps sensitive data x ∈ XS to sensitive obfuscated data y0 ∈ Y0S (resp. y1 ∈ Y1S). Then the sequential composition of Q0 and Q1 maps sensitive data x ∈ XS to pairs (y0, y1) of sensitive obfuscated data ranging over:
Then we obtain the following compositionality.
Proposition 1 (Sequential composition). Let ε0, ε1 ≥ 0. If Q0 provides (XS, Y0S, ε0)-RLDP and Q1(y0) provides (XS, Y1S, ε1)-RLDP for each y0 ∈ Y0, then the sequential composition of Q0 and Q1 provides (XS, (Y0×Y1)S, ε0+ε1)-RLDP.
The proof is given in Appendix B.1. For example, if we apply an obfuscation mechanism providing (XS, YS, ǫ)-RLDP for t times, then we obtain (XS, (YS) t , ǫt)-RLDP in total (this is derived by repeatedly using Proposition 1).
Post-processing. RLDP is immune to the post-processing by a randomized algorithm that maps sensitive (resp. nonsensitive) data to sensitive (resp. non-sensitive) data.
Specifically, if a mechanism Q0 provides (XS, YS, ε)-RLDP and a randomized algorithm Q1 maps sensitive obfuscated data over YS (resp. non-sensitive obfuscated data) to sensitive obfuscated data over ZS (resp. non-sensitive obfuscated data), then the composite function Q1 • Q0 provides (XS, ZS, ε)-RLDP. See Appendix B.2 for details.
For example, RLDP is immune to data cleaning operations (e.g., transforming values, merging disparate values) [28] as long as they are represented as Q1 explained above.
Compatibility with LDP. Since RLDP provides LDP for YS (by (5)), it is compatible with LDP. For example, assume that data collectors A and B adopt a mechanism QA providing (XS, YS, ǫA)-RLDP and a mechanism QB providing ǫB-LDP, respectively. Alice transforms her sensitive personal data in XS into yA ∈ YS (resp. yB ∈ Y) using QA (resp. QB), and sends yA (resp. yB) to the data collector A (resp. B) to request two different services (e.g., location check-in for A and point-of-interest search for B). Then assume that all sensitive obfuscated data in the data collector A are combined with all obfuscated data in the data collector B (i.e., data integration) for analysis. Then the composition (QA, QB) in parallel satisfies the following property:
Proposition 2 (Compatibility with LDP). If QA and QB respectively provide (XS, YS, ǫA)-RLDP and ǫB-LDP, then for any x, x ′ ∈ X , yA ∈ YS, and yB ∈ Y, we have:
The proof is given in Appendix B.3. Proposition 2 implies that Alice's sensitive personal data in XS is protected by (ǫA + ǫB)-LDP in this case.
Relationship with the Bayes Error. Some studies have shown the relationship between DP (or its variant) and the posterior probability of the original data given the output of the mechanism [7, 18, 32, 46] . Similarly, we showed in Appendix B.4 that the restricted mechanism provides an absolute guarantee about privacy protection of sensitive data x ∈ XS as a function of the privacy budget ǫ and the maximum value of the prior probability Pr(X = x). We showed that the Bayes error is not changed by observing Y = y ∈ YS when ǫ = 0. We also showed that the Bayes error probability after observing Y = y ∈ YS becomes 0.5 when ǫ = ln(|X |−1) and Pr(X = x) is uniform, which is consistent with the fact that the ǫ-RR with parameter ǫ = ln(|X | − 1) sends the different data (y = x) with probability 0.5 [24] . See Appendix B.4 for details.
Relationship between RLDP and OSLDP
RLDP is a privacy metric that protects sensitive data in the local model. For comparison, we also consider OSLDP (One-sided Local Differential Privacy), a local model version of OSDP (One-sided Differential Privacy) [14] :
Definition 3 ((XS, ǫ)-OSLDP). Given XS ⊆ X and ǫ ∈ R ≥0 , an obfuscation mechanism Q provides (XS, ǫ)-OSLDP if for any x ∈ XS, any x ′ ∈ X and any y ∈ Y, we have
OSLDP is a special case of OSDP [14] when the number of records is one. As with RLDP, OSLDP provides privacy protection for sensitive data x ∈ XS. The difference between the two is that RLDP partitions Y into YS and YN (whereas OSLDP does not divide Y). RLDP provides ǫ-LDP for YS and has no transitions from XS to YN . On the other hand, OSLDP allows, for any y ∈ Y, the transition probability Q(y|x ′ ) from x ′ ∈ XN to be very large (and hence does not provide ǫ-LDP) and Q(y|x) from x ∈ XS to be positive. Thus, OSLDP can be regarded as a "relaxation" of RLDP. In fact, the following proposition holds: Proposition 3. If an obfuscation mechanism Q provides (XS, YS, ǫ)-RLDP, then it also provides (XS, ǫ)-OSLDP.
Proof. It is easy to check by (4) and (5) that Q provides (6) for any x ∈ XS, any x ′ ∈ X , and any y ∈ Y.
Proposition 3 means that (XS, YS, ǫ)-RLDP is more specific than (XS, ǫ)-OSLDP. We use RLDP as a privacy metric for two reasons. The first reason is that RLDP provides ǫ-LDP for YS and is compatible with LDP, as described in Section 3.2. Note that OSLDP does not have this property in general, because it does not guarantee ǫ-LDP for Y.
The second reason for using RLDP is that it is very promising with regard to data utility. Intuitively, this can be explained by the fact that the data collector knows y ∈ YN is always come from x ∈ XN (by (4)). Below we explain the data utility of RLDP in more detail:
Binary case. For simplicity, we first consider the most basic case where both input and output alphabets are binary (i.e., X = Y = {0, 1}) and the input value 1 is sensitive (i.e., XS = {1}) as in the questionnaires in Section 1. Let q0 = Q(1|0) and q1 = Q(1|1). Without loss of generality, we assume that q1 ≥ 0.5. (If q1 < 0.5, we swap the output values 1 and 0.) Then q1 ≥ q0. We also assume ǫ > 0 because we cannot estimate a distribution when ǫ = 0. By (6) , (XS, ǫ)-OSLDP can be expressed as the class of mechanisms that satisfies 1 − e ǫ (1 − q0) ≤ q1 ≤ e ǫ q0. (XS, YS, ǫ)-RLDP with YS = {1} can be expressed as the class of mechanisms that satisfies q0 ≥ e −ǫ and q1 = 1. In other words, (XS, YS, ǫ)-RLDP is the class of Mangat's RRs that report 1 from 0 with probability q0 ≥ e −ǫ .
Assume that we use the empirical estimation method in Section 2.5. If p(1) = 1, the mechanism with parameter q1 = 1 obviously makes both the l1 and l2 losses to be zero (while the mechanism with q1 = 1 does not), since m(1) = m(1) = 1. If p(1) < 1, the following proposition holds: Proposition 4. Let ǫ > 0. If p(1) < 1, the mechanism Q defined above with parameters q0 = e −ǫ and q1 = 1 uniquely minimizes the l1 loss for a sufficiently large n and the l2 loss for any n among all mechanisms providing (XS, ǫ)-OSLDP.
The proof is given in Appendix F.1. Proposition 4 means that the RLDP mechanism with the smallest q0 (i.e., RLDP mechanism that exhausts privacy budget ǫ) is a unique minimizer of the l1 and l2 losses among all OSLDP mechanisms.
General case. We then consider a general case with arbitrary input and output alphabets. In this case, we use the fact that OSLDP provides the inequality (6) for any x, x ′ ∈ XS and any y ∈ Y (i.e., ǫ-LDP for only XS and Y). Duchi et al. [17] showed that for ǫ ∈ [0, 1], the lower bound on the l1 and l2 losses (minimax rates) of any ǫ-LDP mechanism can be expressed as Θ( |X | √ nǫ 2 ) and Θ( |X | nǫ 2 ), respectively. By directly applying this lower bound to XS and Y, the lower bound on the l1 and l2 losses of any (XS, ǫ)-OSLDP mechanisms for ǫ ∈ [0, 1] can be expressed as Θ( |X S | √ nǫ 2 ) and Θ( |X S | nǫ 2 ), respectively (see Appendix F.2 for proof). In Section 4.3, we show that our restricted RAPPOR achieves this lower bound when ǫ is close to 0 (i.e., high privacy regime). We also show that our restricted RR achieves almost the same data utility as a non-private mechanism when ǫ = ln |X | (i.e., low privacy regime) and |XS| ≪ |X |. These results show that RLDP is a class of mechanisms that provide very high utility while protecting sensitive data.
RESTRICTED MECHANISMS
In this section, we focus on the common-mechanism scenario and propose the restricted RR (Randomized Response) and restricted RAPPOR (Sections 4.1 and 4.2). We then analyze the data utility of these mechanisms (Section 4.3). We propose the restricted RR (Randomized Response), which is a generalization of Mangat's randomized response [31] to |X |-ary alphabets with |XS| sensitive symbols. As with the RR, the output range of the restricted RR is identical to the input domain; i.e., X = Y. In addition, we divide the output set into the sensitive set and the non-sensitive set in the same way as the input set; i.e., XS = YS, XN = YN . Figure 2 shows the restricted RR with XS = YS = {x1, x2, x3} and XN = YN = {x4, x5, x6}. The restricted RR applies the ǫ-RR to the sensitive sets XS and YS. It maps x ∈ XN to y ∈ YS (= XS) with the probability Q(y|x) so that (5) is satisfied, and maps x ∈ XN to itself with the remaining probability. Formally, we define the restricted RR as follows:
Restricted Randomized Response
Then the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RR is an obfuscation mechanism that maps x ∈ X to y ∈ Y (= X ) with the probability QrRR(y|x) defined as follows:
(ii) if x ∈ XN : Proof. It follows from (7) that (4) holds. Since c1/c2 = e ǫ , the inequality (5) also holds (note that c3 is uniquely determined from c2 so that the sum of probabilities from x ∈ XN is 1; i.e., c3 = 1 − |XS|c2).
Restricted RAPPOR
Next, we propose the restricted RAPPOR with the input alphabet X = {x1, x2, · · · , x |X | } and the output alphabet Y = {0, 1} |X | . Without loss of generality, we assume here that x1, · · · , x |X S | represent sensitive data and x |X S |+1 , · · · , x |X | represent non-sensitive data; i.e., XS = {x1, · · · , x |X S | }, XN = {x |X S |+1 , · · · , x |X | }. Figure 3 shows the restricted RAPPOR with XS = {x1, · · · , x4} and XN = {x5, · · · , x10}. The restricted RAPPOR first deterministically maps xi ∈ X to the i-th standard basis vector ei. It should be noted that if xi is sensitive data ‫ݔ‬ ଷ ݁ ൌ ሺ0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0ሻ ‫ݕ‬ ൌ ሺ1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0ሻ ‫ݔ‬ ݁ ൌ ሺ0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0ሻ ‫ݕ‬ ൌ ሺ0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0ሻ Figure 3 : Restricted RAPPOR in the case where XS = {x1, · · · , x4} and XN = {x5, · · · , x10}.
(i.e., xi ∈ XS), then the last |XN | elements in ei are always zero (as shown in the upper-left panel of Figure 3 ). Based on this fact, the restricted RAPPOR regards obfuscated data y = (y1, y2, . . . , y |X | ) ∈ {0, 1} |X | such that y |X S |+1 = · · · = y |X | = 0 as sensitive obfuscated data; i.e.,
Then it applies the (θ, ǫ)-generalized RAPPOR to the sensitive sets XS and YS, and maps x ∈ XN to y ∈ YS (as shown in the lower-left panel of Figure 3 ) with the probability Q(y|x) so that (5) is satisfied. We now formally define the restricted RAPPOR:
Then the (XS, θ,ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR is an obfuscation mechanism that maps xi ∈ X to y ∈ Y = {0, 1} |X | with the probability QrRAP (y|x) given by:
where Pr(yj|xi) is written as follows:
(ii) if |XS| + 1 ≤ j ≤ |X |:
Proposition 6. The (XS, θ,ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR provides (XS, YS, ǫ)-RLDP, where YS is given by (9) .
The proof is given in Appendix B.5. Although we used the generalized RAPPOR in XS and YS in Definition 5, hereinafter we set θ = e ǫ/2 e ǫ/2 +1 in the same way as the original RAPPOR [43] . There are two reasons for this. First, it achieves "order" optimal data utility among all (XS, ǫ)-OSLDP mechanisms in the high privacy regime, as shown in Section 4.3. Second, it maps xi ∈ XN to y ∈ YN with probability 1 − d2 = 1 − e −ǫ/2 , which is close to 1 when ǫ is large (i.e., low privacy regime). Wang et al. [45] showed that the generalized RAPPOR with parameter θ = 1 2 minimizes the variance of the estimate. However, our restricted RAPPOR with parameter θ = 1 2 maps xi ∈ XN to y ∈ YN with prob-
2e ǫ which is less than 1 − e −ǫ/2 for any ǫ > 0 and is less than 1 2 even when ǫ goes to infinity. Thus, our restricted RAPPOR with θ = e ǫ/2 e ǫ/2 +1 maps xi ∈ XN to y ∈ YN with higher probability, and therefore achieves a smaller estimation error over all non-sensitive data. We also consider that an optimal θ for our restricted RAPPOR is different from the optimal θ (= 1 2 ) for the generalized RAPPOR. We leave finding the optimal θ for our restricted RAPPOR (with respect to the estimation error over all personal data) as future work.
We refer to the (XS, θ, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR with θ = e ǫ/2 e ǫ/2 +1 in shorthand as the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR.
Utility Analysis
We now evaluate the l1 loss of the restricted RR and restricted RAPPOR when the empirical estimation method is used for distribution estimation. In particular, we evaluate the l1 loss when ǫ is close to 0 (i.e., high privacy regime) and ǫ = ln |X | (i.e., low privacy regime). The proofs of all propositions in Section 4.3 are given in Appendix C.
Restricted RR in the general case. We begin with the l1 loss of the restricted RR.
Then the expected l1 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RR mechanism is given by:
where f (n) ≈ g(n) represents limn→∞ f (n)/g(n) = 1.
Let pU N be the uniform distribution over XN ; i.e., for any x ∈ XS, pU N (x) = 0, and for any x ∈ XN , pU N (x) = 1 |X N | . Symmetrically, let pU S be the uniform distribution over XS.
For 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN | + 1), the l1 loss is maximized by pU N :
Proposition 8. For any 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN | + 1) and |XS| ≤ |XN |, the right-hand side of (13) is maximized by pU N :
For ǫ ≥ ln(|XN |+1), the l1 loss is maximized by a mixture distribution of pU N and pU S :
Then for any ǫ ≥ ln(|XN | + 1), the right-hand side of (13) is maximized by p * :
where f (n) g(n) represents limn→∞ f (n)/g(n) ≤ 1.
Next, we instantiate the l1 loss in the high and low privacy regimes based on these propositions.
Restricted RR in the high privacy regime. When ǫ is close to 0, we have e ǫ − 1 ≈ ǫ. Thus, the right-hand side of (14) in Proposition 8 can be simplified as follows:
It was shown in [24] that the expected l1 loss of the ǫ-RR is at most
when ǫ ≈ 0. Thus, by (17), the expected l1 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RR is much smaller than that of the ǫ-RR when |XS| ≪ |X |. Restricted RR in the low privacy regime. When ǫ = ln |X | and |XS| ≪ |X |, the right-hand side of (16) in Proposition 9 can be simplified by using |XS|/|X | ≈ 0:
It should be noted that the expected l1 loss of the nonprivate mechanism, which does not obfuscate the personal data at all, is at most 2(|X |−1) nπ [24] . Thus, when ǫ = ln |X | and |XS| ≪ |X |, the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RR achieves almost the same data utility as the non-private mechanism, whereas the expected l1 loss of the ǫ-RR is twice larger than that of the non-private mechanism [24] . Restricted RAPPOR in the general case. We then show the l1 loss of the restricted RAPPOR.
Proposition 10 (l1 loss of the restricted RAPPOR). Let ǫ ∈ R ≥0 , u ′ = e ǫ/2 − 1, and vN = e ǫ/2 e ǫ/2 −1 . The expected l1-loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR mechanism is:
When 0 < ǫ < 2 ln( |X N | 2 + 1), the l1 loss is maximized by the uniform distribution pU N over XN :
Proposition 11. For any 0 < ǫ < 2 ln( |X N | 2 + 1) and |XS| ≤ |XN |, the right-hand side of (18) is maximized when p = pU N :
Note that this proposition covers a wide range of ǫ. For example, when |XS| ≤ |XN |, it covers both the high privacy regime (ǫ ≈ 0) and low privacy regime (ǫ = ln |X |), since ln |X | < 2 ln( |X N | 2 + 1). Below we instantiate the l1 loss in the high and low privacy regimes based on this proposition. Restricted RAPPOR in the high privacy regime. If ǫ is close to 0, we have e ǫ/2 − 1 ≈ ǫ/2. Thus, the right-hand side of (19) in Proposition 11 can be simplified as follows:
It is shown in [24] that the expected l1 loss of the ǫ-RAPPOR is at most 2 nπ · 2|X | ǫ when ǫ ≈ 0. Thus, by (20) , the expected l1 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR is much smaller than that of the ǫ-RAPPOR when |XS| ≪ |X |. Furthermore, by (20) , the expected l1 loss of the (XS, ǫ)restricted RAPPOR in the worst case is expressed as Θ( |X S | √ nǫ 2 ) in the high privacy regime. As described in Section 3.3, this is "order" optimal among all (XS, ǫ)-OSLDP mechanisms (in Appendix D, we also show that the expected l2 of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR is expressed as Θ( |X S | nǫ 2 )). Restricted RAPPOR in the low privacy regime. If ǫ = ln |X | and |XS| ≪ |X | 3 4 , the right-hand side of (19) can be simplified, using |XS|/|X | 3 4 ≈ 0, as follows:
Thus, when ǫ = ln |X | and |XS| ≪ |X | 3 4 , the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR also achieves almost the same data utility as the non-private mechanism, whereas the expected l1 loss of the ǫ-RAPPOR is |X | times larger than that of the non-private mechanism [24] .
Summary. In summary, the restricted RR and restricted RAPPOR provide much higher utility than the RR and RAPPOR when |XS| ≪ |X |. Moreover, the restricted RR and restricted RAPPOR can achieve almost the same data utility as a non-private mechanism when ǫ = ln |X |.
PERSONALIZED RESTRICTED MECH-ANISMS
We now consider the personalized-mechanism scenario (outlined in Section 2.1), and propose a PRM (Personalized Restricted Mechanism) with κ semantic tags to keep secret what is sensitive for each user while enabling the data collector to estimate a distribution.
Sections 5.1 describes the PRM. Section 5.2 explains its privacy properties. Section 5.3 proposes a method to estimate the distribution p from Y obfuscated using the PRM. Section 5.4 analyzes the data utility of the PRM. Figure 4 shows the overview of the PRM Q (i) for the i-th user (i = 1, 2, . . . , n). It first deterministically maps personal data x ∈ X to intermediate data using a pre-processor f (i) pre, and then maps the intermediate data to obfuscated data y ∈ Y using a restricted mechanism Qcmn common to all users. The pre-processor f (i) pre maps user-specific sensitive data x ∈ X (i) S to one of κ bots: ⊥1, ⊥2, · · · , or ⊥κ. The κ bots represent user-specific sensitive data, and each of them is associated with a semantic tag such as "home" or "workplace". The semantic tag is useful when the data collector has some background knowledge about p conditioned on each tag. For example, a distribution of POIs tagged as "home" or "workplace" can be easily obtained via the Fousquare venue API [50] . Although this is not a user distribution but a "POI distribution", it can be used to roughly approximate the distribution of users tagged as "home" or "workplace", as shown in Section 6. We define a set Z of intermediate data by Z = X ∪ {⊥1, · · · , ⊥κ}, and a set ZS of sensitive intermediate data by ZS = XS ∪ {⊥1, · · · , ⊥κ}.
PRM with κ Semantic Tags
Formally, the PRM Q (i) first maps personal data x ∈ X to intermediate data z ∈ Z using a pre-processor f (i) pre : X → Z specific to each user. The pre-processor f Figure 4 : Overview of the PRM Q (i) . It is composed of a pre-processor f (i) pre and a restricted mechanism Qcmn common to all users; i.e.,
to the corresponding bot ⊥ k , and maps other data to themselves. Let X (i) S,k be a set of the i-th user's sensitive data associated with the k-th tag (e.g., set of regions including her primary home and second home). Then, X
After mapping personal data x ∈ X to intermediate data z ∈ Z, the (ZS, YS, ǫ)-restricted mechanism Qcmn maps z to obfuscated data y ∈ Y. Examples of Qcmn include the (ZS, ǫ)-restricted RR (in Definition 4) and (ZS, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR (in Definition 5). As a whole, the PRM Q (i) can be expressed as:
pre. The i-th user stores f (i) pre and Qcmn in a device that obfuscates her personal data (e.g., mobile phone, personal computer), and keeps f (i) pre secret. The restricted mechanism Qcmn, which is common to all users, is available to the data collector.
The feature of the proposed PRM Q (i) is two-fold: (i) the secrecy of the pre-processor f (i) pre and (ii) the κ semantic tags. By the first feature, the i-th user can keep X (i) S (i.e., what is sensitive for her) secret, as described in Section 5.2 in detail. On the other hand, the second feature enables the data collector to estimate a distribution p with high accuracy. Specifically, she estimates p from obfuscated data Y using Qcmn and some background knowledge about p conditioned on each tag, as described in Section 5.3 in detail.
In practice, it may happen that a user has her specific sensitive data x ∈ X (i) S that is not associated with any semantic tags. For example, if we prepare only tags named "home" and "workplace", then sightseeing places, restaurants, and any other places are not associated with these tags. One way to deal with such data is to create another bot associated with a tag named "others" (e.g., if ⊥1 and ⊥2 are associated with "home" and "workplace", respectively, we create ⊥3 associated with "others"), and map x to this bot. It would be difficult for the data collector to obtain background knowledge about p conditioned on such a tag. In Section 5.3, we will explain how to estimate p in this case.
Privacy Properties
We analyze the privacy properties of the PRM Q (i) . First, we show that it provides RLDP. (See Appendix E.1 for the proof.)
We then analyze the secrecy of X (i) S . The data collector, who knows the common-mechanism Qcmn, cannot obtain any information about X (i) S from Qcmn. Specifically, the data collector knows, for each z ∈ Z, whether z ∈ ZS or not by viewing Qcmn. However, she cannot obtain any information about X (i) S from ZS, because she does not know the mapping between X (i) S and {⊥1, · · · , ⊥κ} (i.e., f (i) pre). In addition, Proposition 12 guarantees that y ∈ YS provides almost no information about x ∈ X and hence X (i) S . For example, assume that the i-th user obfuscates her home x ∈ X using the PRM Q (i) , and sends y ∈ YS to the data collector. The data collector cannot infer either x ∈ X or z ∈ Z from y ∈ YS, since both Qcmn and Q (i) provide RLDP. This means that the data collector cannot infer the fact that she was at home from y. Furthermore, the data collector cannot infer where her home is, since X (i) S cannot be inferred from Qcmn and y ∈ YS as explained above.
We need to take a little care when the i-th user obfuscates x ∈ XN using Q (i) and sends y ∈ YN to the data collector. In this case, the data collector learns the original data x from y (both the restricted RR and restricted RAPPOR allow her to completely know x ∈ XN from y ∈ YN ), and therefore learns that x is not sensitive (i.e., x / ∈ X (i) S ). Thus, the data collector, who knows that the user wants to hide her home, would reduce the number of possible candidates for her home from X to X \{x}. However, if |X | is large (e.g., |X | = 625 in our experiments using location data), the number |X | − 1 of candidates is still large. Since the data collector cannot further reduce the number of candidates using Qcmn, her home is still kept strongly secret. In Section 7, we also explain that the secrecy of X (i) S is achieved under reasonable assumptions even when she sends multiple data.
Distribution Estimation
We now explain how to estimate a distribution p from data Y obfuscated using the PRM. Let r (i) be a distribution of intermediate data for the i-th user:
and r be the average of r (i) over n users; i.e., r(z) = 1 n n i=1 r (i) (z) for any z ∈ Z. Note that x∈X p(x) = 1 and z∈Z r(z) = 1. Furthermore, let π k be a distribution of personal data x ∈ X conditioned on ⊥ k defined by: (22) is a normalized sum of the probability p(x) of personal data x whose corresponding intermediate data is ⊥ k . Note that although x ∈ X is deterministically mapped to z ∈ Z for each user, we can consider the probability distribution π k for n users. For example, if ⊥ k is tagged as "home", then π k is a distribution of users at home. We propose a method to estimate a distribution p from obfuscated data Y using some background knowledge about π k as an estimateπ k of π k (we also explain the case where we do not have the background knowledge later). Our estimation method first estimates a distribution r of intermediate data from obfuscated data Y using Qcmn. This can be performed in the same way as the common-mechanism scenario. Letr be the estimate of r.
After computingr, our method estimates p using the estimateπ k (i.e., background knowledge about π k ) as follows:
Note thatp in (23) can be regarded as an empirical estimate of p. Moreover, if bothr andπ k are in the probability simplex C, thenp in (23) is always in C.
If we do not have estimatesπ k for some bots (like the one tagged as "others" in Section 5.1), then we setπ k (x) in proportion tor(x) over x ∈ XN (i.e.,π k (x) =r (x)
x ′ ∈X Nr (x ′ ) ) for such bots. When we do not have any background knowledgê π1, · · · ,πκ for all bots, it amounts to simply discarding the estimatesr(⊥1), · · · ,r(⊥κ) for κ bots and normalizingr(x) over x ∈ XN so that the sum is one.
Utility Analysis
We now theoretically analyze the data utility of our PRM. Recall thatp,r, andπ k are the estimate of the distribution of personal data, intermediate data, and personal data conditioned on ⊥ k , respectively. In the following, we show that the l1 loss ofp can be upper-bounded as follows:
The proof is given in Appendix E.2. Theorem 1 means that the upper-bound on the l1 loss ofp can be "decomposed" into the l1 loss ofr and the l1 loss ofπ k weighted byr(⊥ k ).
The first term in (24) is the l1 loss ofr, which depends on the common-mechanism Qcmn. For example, if we use the restricted RR and RAPPOR as Qcmn, the expectation of l1(r, r) is given by Propositions 7 and 10, respectively. In Section 6, we show they are very small.
The second term in (24) is the summation of the l1 loss ofπ k weighted byr(⊥ k ). If we accurately estimate π k , the second term is very small. In other words, if we have enough background knowledge about π k , we can accurately estimate p in the personalized-mechanism scenario.
It is important to note that when the probabilityr(⊥ k ) is small, the second term in (24) is small even if we do not have any background knowledge about π k . For example, when only a small number of users map x ∈ X (i) S to a tag named "others", they hardly affect the accuracy ofp. Moreover, the second term in (24) is upper-bounded by 2 κ k=1r (⊥ k ), since the l1 loss is at most 2. Thus, after computingr, the data collector can easily compute the worst-case value of the second term in (24) to know the effect of the estimation error ofπ k on the accuracy ofp.
Last but not least, the second term in (24) does not depend on ǫ (while the first term depends on ǫ). Thus, the effect of the second term is relatively small when ǫ is small (i.e., high privacy regime), as shown in Section 6.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Experimental Set-up
We conducted experiments using two large-scale datasets:
Foursquare dataset. The Foursquare dataset (global-scale check-in dataset) [50] is one of the largest location datasets among publicly available datasets (e.g., see [8] , [36] , [51] , [53] ); it contains 33278683 check-ins all over the world, each of which is associated with a POI ID and venue category (e.g., restaurant, shop, hotel, hospital, home, workplace).
In our experiments, we used 359054 check-in data in Manhattan, assuming that each check-in data is from a different user. Then we divided Manhattan into 25 × 25 regions at regular intervals and used them as input alphabets; i.e., |X | = 625. The size of each region is about 400m (horizontal) × 450m (vertical). We assumed a region that includes a hospital visited by at least ten users as a sensitive region common to all users. The number of such regions was |XS| = 15. In addition, we assumed a region in XN that includes a user's home or workplace as her user-specific sensitive region. The number of users at home and workplace was 5040 and 19532, respectively.
US Census dataset. The US Census (1990) dataset [30] was collected as part of the 1990 U.S. census. It contains responses from 2458285 people (each person provides one response), each of which contains 68 attributes.
We used the responses from all people, and used age, income, marital status, and sex as attributes. Each attribute has 8, 5, 5, and 2 categories, respectively. (See [30] for details about the value of each category ID.) We regarded a tuple of the category IDs as a total category ID, and used it as an input alphabet; i.e., |X | = 400 (= 8 × 5 × 5 × 2). We considered the fact that "divorce" and "unemployment" might be sensitive for many users [29] , and regarded such categories as sensitive for all users (to be on the safe side, as described in Section 2.1). Note that people might be students until their twenties and might retire in their fifties or sixties. Children of age twelve and under cannot get married. We excluded such categories from sensitive ones. The number of sensitive categories was |XS| = 76.
We used a frequency distribution of all people as a true distribution p, and randomly chose a half of all people as users who provide their obfuscated data; i.e., n = 179527 and 1229143 in the Foursquare and US Census datasets, respectively. Here we did not use all people, because we would like to evaluate the non-private mechanism that does not obfuscate the personal data; i.e., the non-private mechanism has an estimation error in our experiments due to the random sampling from the population.
As utility, we evaluated the TV (Total Variation) by computing the sample mean over a hundred realizations of Y .
Experimental Results
Common-mechanism scenario. We first focused on the common-mechanism scenario, and evaluated the RR, RAP-POR, restricted RR, and restricted RAPPOR using both of the two datasets. As distribution estimation methods, we used empirical estimation, empirical estimation with the significance threshold, and EM reconstruction (denoted by "emp", "emp+thr", and "EM", respectively). In "emp+thr", we set the significance level α to be α = 0.05, and uniformly assigned the remaining probability to each of the estimates below the significance threshold in the same way as [45] . Figure 5 shows the results in the case where ǫ is changed from 0.1 to 10. "rRR", "rRAP", and "no privacy" represent the restricted RR, restricted RAPPOR, and nonprivate mechanism, respectively. It can be seen that our mechanisms outperform the existing mechanisms by one or two orders of magnitude. Our mechanisms are effective especially in the Foursquare dataset, since the proportion of sensitive regions is very small (15/625 = 0.024). Moreover, the restricted RR provides almost the same performance as the non-private mechanism when ǫ = ln |X |, as described in Section 4.3. It can also be seen that "emp+thr" and "EM" significantly outperform "emp", since the estimates in "emp+thr" and "EM" are always non-negative. Although "EM" outperforms "emp+thr" for the RAPPOR and restricted RAPPOR when ǫ was large, the two estimation methods provide very close performance as a whole.
We then evaluated the relationship between the number of sensitive regions/categories and the TV. To this end, we randomly chose XS from X , and increased |XS| from 1 to |X | (only in this experiment). We attempted one hundred cases for randomly choosing XS from X , and evaluated the TV by computing the sample mean over one hundred cases. Figure 6 shows the results in the case where ǫ = 0.1 (high privacy regime) or ln |X | (low privacy regime). Here we omit the performance of "emp+thr", since it is very close to that of "EM" in the same way as in Figure 5 . It can be seen that the restricted RAPPOR and restricted RR provide the best performance when ǫ = 0.1 and ln |X |, respectively. In addition, the restricted RR provides the performance close to the non-private mechanism when ǫ = ln |X | and the number |XS| of sensitive regions/categories is less than 100. The performance of the restricted RAPPOR is also close to that of the non-private mechanism when |XS| is less than 20 (note Figure 6 : |XS| vs. TV when ǫ = 0.1 or ln |X |. that |X | 3 4 = 125 and 89 in the Foursquare and US Census datasets, respectively). However, it rapidly increases with increase in |XS|. Overall, our theoretical results in Section 4.3 hold for the two real datasets.
We also evaluated the performance when the number of attributes was increased from 4 to 9 in the US Census dataset. We added, one by one, five attributes as to whether or not a user has served in the military during five periods ("Sept80", "May75880", "Vietnam", "Feb55", and "Korean" in [15] ; we added them in this order). We assumed that these attributes are non-sensitive. Since each of the five attributes had two categories (1: yes, 0: no), |X | (resp. |XS|) was changed from 400 to 12800 (resp. from 76 to 2432). We randomly chose n = 240000 people as users who provide obfuscated data, and evaluated the TV by computing the sample mean over ten realizations of Y (only in this experiment). Figure 7 shows the results in the case where ǫ = 0.1, 1.0, or 6.0 (=ln 400). Here we omit the performance of "emp+thr" in the same way as Figure 6 . Although the TV increases with an increase in the number of attributes, overall our restricted mechanisms remain effective, compared to the existing mechanisms. One exception is the case where ǫ = 0.1 and the number of attributes is 9; the TV of the RR (EM), RAPPOR (EM), and the restricted RR (EM) is almost 1. Note that when we use the EM reconstruction method, the worst value of the TV is 1. Thus, as with the RR and RAP-POR, the restricted RR fails to estimate a distribution in this case. On the other hand, the TV of the restricted RAP-POR (EM) is much smaller than 1 even in this case, which is consistent with the fact that the restricted RAPPOR is order optimal in the high privacy regime. Overall, the restricted RAPPOR is robust to the increase of the attributes at the same value of ǫ (note that for large |X |, ǫ = 1.0 or 6.0 is a medium privacy regime where 0 ≪ ǫ ≪ ln |X |). We also measured the running time (i.e., time to estimate p from Y ) of "EM" (which sets the estimate by "emp+thr" as an initial value ofp) on an Intel Xeon CPU E5-2620 v3 (2.40 GHz, 6 cores, 12 logical processors) with 32 GB RAM. We found that the running time increases roughly linearly with the number of attributes. For example, when ǫ = 6.0 and the number of attributes is 9, the running time of "EM" required 3121, 1258, 5225, and 1073 seconds for "RR", "rRR", "RAP", and "rRAP", respectively. We also measured the running time of 'emp" and "emp+thr", and found that they required less than one second even when the number of attributes is 9. Thus, if "EM" requires too much time for a large number of attributes, "emp+thr" would be a good alternative to "EM".
Personalized-mechanism scenario. We then focused on the personalized-mechanism scenario, and evaluated our restricted mechanisms using the Foursquare dataset. We used the PRM with κ = 2 semantic tags (described in Section 5.1), which maps "home" and 'workplace" to bots ⊥1 and ⊥2, respectively. As the background knowledge about the bot distribution π k (1 ≤ k ≤ 2), we considered three cases: (I) we do not have any background knowledge (i.e., π k (x) =r(x)); (II) we use a distribution of POIs tagged as "home" (resp. "workplace"), which is computed from the POI data in [50] , as an estimate of the bot probabilityπ1 (resp.π2); (III) we use the true distributions (i.e.,π k = π k ). Regarding (II), we emphasize again that it is not a user distribution but a "POI distribution", and can be easily obtained via the Foursquare venue API [50] . Figure 8 shows the results. We also show the POI distributions and true distributions in Figure 9 . It can be seen that the performance of (II) lies in between that of (I) and (III), which shows that the estimateπ k of the bot distribution affects data utility. However, when ǫ is smaller than 1, all of (I), (II), and (III) provide almost the same perfor- mance, since the effect of the estimation error ofπ k does not depend on ǫ, as described in Section 5.4. We also computed the l1 loss l1(p, p) and the first and second terms in the right-hand side of (24) to investigate whether Theorem 1 holds. Table 1 shows the results (we averaged the values over one hundred realizations of Y ). It can be seen that l1(p, p) is smaller than the summation of the first and second terms in all of the methods, which shows that Theorem 1 holds in our experiments.
MSE.
We finally show the relationship between the privacy budget ǫ and the MSE when we use the EM reconstruction method. As with the TV, we evaluated the MSE by computing the sample mean over a hundred realizations of Y . Figure 10 shows the results. It can be seen from Figures 5, 8, and 10 that a similar tendency to the results of the TV is obtained for the results of the MSE, meaning that our methods are effective in terms of both the l1 and l2 losses.
From these experimental results, we conclude that our proposed methods are very effective in both the commonmechanism and personalized-mechanism scenario.
DISCUSSIONS
On the case of multiple data per user. We have so far assumed that each user sends only a single data. Now we discuss the case where each user sends multiple data based on the compositionality of RLDP described in Section 3.2. Specifically, assume that a user wants to send t (> 1) data. Then we obtain (XS, (YS) t , ǫ)-RLDP in total by obfuscating each data using the (XS, YS, ǫ/t)-restricted mechanism. Note that the amount of noise added to each data increases with increase in t. However, if t is small for some users, the data collector may accurately estimate p, as shown in [33] .
Next we discuss the secrecy of X (i) S . Assume that the i-th user sends tS sensitive obfuscated data in YS and tN nonsensitive obfuscated data in YN where t = tS + tN > 1. If all the tN data in YN are different from each other, the data collector learns tN original data in XN . However, in many practical applications, a user's personal data is highly non-uniform and sparse. In locations data, for example, a user often visits only a small number of regions in the whole map X . Let T (i) ⊆ XN be a set of possible input values for the i-th user in XN . Then, even if tN is very large, the data collector learns at most |T (i) | data in XN .
In addition, the tS data in YS provide almost no information about X (i) S , since Q (i) provides (XS, (YS) t , ǫ)-RLDP.
Moreover, Qcmn provides no information about X
pre is kept secret. Thus, the data collector, who knows that the user wants to hide her home, cannot reduce the number of candidates for her home from max{|X | − tN , |X | − |T (i) |} using the tS data and Qcmn. If either tN or |T (i) | is much smaller than |X |, her home is kept strongly secret.
On the correlation between XS and XN . It should also be noted that there might be a correlation between sensitive data XS and non-sensitive data XN . For example, if a user discloses a non-sensitive region close to a sensitive region including her home, the adversary might infer approximate information about the original location (e.g., the fact that the user lives in Paris). However, we emphasize that if the size of each region is large, the adversary cannot infer the exact location such as the exact home address. Similar approaches can be seen in a state-of-the-art location privacy metric called geo-indistinguishability [4, 6, 34, 39] . Andrés et al. [4] considered privacy protection within a radius of 200m from the original location, whereas the size of each region in our experiments was about 400m × 450m (as described in Section 6.1). We can protect the exact location by setting the size of each region to be large enough, or setting all regions close to a user's sensitive location to be sensitive.
There might also be a correlation between two attributes (e.g., income and marital status) in the US Census dataset. However, we combined the four category IDs into a total category ID for each user as described in Section 6.1. Thus, there is only "one" category ID for each user. Assuming that each user's data is independent, there is no correlation between data. Therefore, we conclude that the sensitive data are strongly protected in both the Foursquare and US Census datasets in our experiments.
It should be noted, however, that the number of total category IDs increases exponentially with the number of attributes. Thus, when there are many attributes as in Figure 7 , the estimation accuracy might be increased by obfuscating each attribute independently (rather than obfuscating a total ID) while considering the correlation among attributes. We also need to consider a correlation among "users" for some types of personal data (e.g., flu status). For rigorously protecting such correlated data, we should incorporate Pufferfish privacy [27, 40] , which is used to protect correlated data, into RLDP. We leave it as future work.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced the notion of RLDP that guarantees privacy equivalent to LDP for only sensitive data. We proposed RLDP mechanisms in both the common and personalized mechanism scenarios. We evaluated the utility of our mechanisms theoretically and demonstrated the effectiveness of our mechanisms through experiments.
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APPENDIX A. NOTATIONS
We show the basic notations used throughout this paper in Table 2 .
B. PROPERTIES OF RLDP MECHANISMS
In this section we present basic properties of RLDP: adaptive sequential composition, post-processing, and the relationship with the Bayes error. We also prove that the restricted RAPPOR provides RLDP.
B.1 Sequential Composition
In this section we present the compositionality of RLDP mechanisms. We recall the definition of sequential compositions as follows.
Definition 6 (Sequential composition). Given two obfuscation mechanism Q0 from X to Y0 and Q1 from Y0 × X to Y1, we define the (adaptive) sequential composition of Q0 and Q1 as the obfuscation mechanism Q from X to Y0 × Y1 that is defined by: for each x ∈ X , y0 ∈ Y0, and y1 ∈ Y1, Q((y0, y1)|x) = Q0(y0|x)Q1(y1|(y0, x)).
To make this definition consistent with the sensitive/nonsensitive data sets, we define the notions of the sensitive set (Y0×Y1)S of pairs of outputs and the non-sensitive set (Y0× Y1)N of pairs of outputs as follows. Recall that whenever an input is sensitive, the output of an RLDP mechanism is also sensitive. Thus, for any x ∈ XS, any y0 ∈ Y0N , and any y1 ∈ Y1N , we have Q0(y0|x) = 0 and Q1(y1|(y0, x)) = 0. This implies that if either y0 ∈ YN or y1 ∈ YN , then Q((y0, y1)|x) = Q0(y0|x)Q1(y1|(y0, x)) = 0. In other words, when an input x is sensitive, then the corresponding two outputs y0 and y1 of Q are also sensitive. Based on this observation, we define (Y0 × Y1)S and (Y0 × Y1)N by:
Note that Y0 × Y1 = (Y0 × Y1)S ∪ (Y0 × Y1)N .
Proof. Let Q be the sequential composition of Q0 and Q1. We first show that Q satisfies the first condition (4) in Definition 2. Let x ∈ XS and (y0, y1) ∈ (Y0 × Y1)N . By definition, either y0 ∈ Y0N or y1 ∈ Y1N holds. If y0 ∈ Y0N then Q0(y0|x) = 0 hence Q((y0, y1)|x) = Q0(y0|x) Q1(y1|(y0, x)) = 0. If y1 ∈ Y1N then Q1(y1|(y0, x)) = 0 hence Q((y0, y1)|x) = 0.
Next we show that Q satisfies the second condition (5) . Let x, x ′ ∈ X and (y0, y1) ∈ (Y0 × Y1)S. Then y0 ∈ YS0 and y1 ∈ YS1. Hence we obtain:
B.2 Post-processing
To derive a post-processing property of RLDP, we first define a class of post-processing randomized algorithms that preserve "data sensitivity", i.e., the randomized algorithms that map only sensitive (resp. non-sensitive) data to some sensitive (resp. non-sensitive) data. Note that the notion of data sensitivity in this section is different from the sensitivity of a privacy mechanism [19] used in the literature of differential privacy.
Definition 7 (Preservation of data sensitivity). Let YS and ZS be two sets of sensitive data, and YN and ZN be two sets of non-sensitive data. Given a randomized algorithm Q from YS ∪ YN to ZS ∪ ZN , we say that Q preserves the data sensitivity if it satisfies:
• for any y ∈ YS and any z ∈ ZN , Q1(z|y) = 0, and • for any y ∈ YN and any z ∈ ZS, Q1(z|y) = 0.
Then we show that RLDP is immune to the post-processing by this class of randomized algorithms.
Proposition 13 (Post-processing). Let ε ≥ 0. Let ZS and ZN be sets of sensitive and non-sensitive data respectively, and Z = ZS ∪ ZN . Let Q1 be a randomized algorithm from Y to Z that preserves the data sensitivity. If an obfuscation mechanism Q0 from X to Y provides (XS, YS, ε)-RLDP then the composite function Q1 • Q0 provides (XS, ZS, ε)-RLDP.
Proof. We first show that Q satisfies the first condition (4) in Definition 2. Let x ∈ XS and z ∈ ZN . By the (XS, YS, ε)-RLDP of Q0, Q0(y|x) = 0 holds for all y ∈ YN . Since Q1 preserves the data sensitivity, Q1(z|y) = 0 holds for all y ∈ YS. Hence we obtain:
Next we show that Q satisfies the second condition (5) . Let x, x ′ ∈ X and z ∈ ZS. Since Q1 preserves the data sensitivity, Q1(z|y) = 0 holds for all y ∈ YN . Then we obtain:
Therefore Q1 • Q0 provides ε-RLDP.
B.3 Compatibility with LDP
Below we prove the compatibility of RLDP with LDP.
Proof. By (1) and (5), we have:
B.4 Bayes Error
Some studies showed the relationship between differential privacy (or its variant) and the posterior probability of the original data given the output of the mechanism [7, 18, 32, 46] . We also show the relationship with the Bayes error to provide the Bayesian interpretation of RLDP.
Let X (resp. Y ) be a random variable representing personal data (resp. obfuscated data). Consider an adversary who observes sensitive obfuscated data Y = y ∈ YS and attempts to identify the corresponding personal data X. We can regard this as the |X |-class classification, and define the following error probabilities:
β X|Y =y := 1 − max x∈X Pr(X = x|Y = y).
βX (resp. β X|Y =y ) is the lowest possible probability of identification error (i.e., Bayes error [21] ) before (resp. after) observing Y = y. We now show the relationship between these error probabilities and RLDP: Proposition 14. If an obfuscation mechanism Q provides (XS, YS, ǫ)-RLDP, then for any y ∈ YS, we have
. .
Let x * ∈ X be personal data that maximizes Pr(X = x|Y = y); i.e., x * = arg maxx Pr(X = x|Y = y). Since the righthand side of (28) is monotonically increasing with respect to Pr(X = x), β X|Y =y can be expressed, using (25) , (26) and (28) , as follows:
.
Proposition 14 means that the restricted mechanism provides an absolute guarantee about privacy protection of sensitive data x ∈ XS (recall that the output from XS is restricted to YS) as a function of the privacy budget ǫ and the maximum value βX of the prior probability Pr(X = x).
For example, when ǫ = 0, the right-hand side of (27) becomes βX , which means that the Bayes error is not changed by observing Y = y. For another example, the ǫ-RR with parameter ǫ = ln(|X | − 1) sends the different data (i.e., y = x) with probability 0.5, and therefore provides plausible deniability [24] . When ǫ = ln(|X | − 1) and the prior probability Pr(X = x) is uniform over X , the right-hand side of (27) becomes 0.5, which is consistent with the privacy property of the ǫ-RR with parameter ǫ = ln(|X | − 1) (for the ǫ-RR, the Bayes error probability after observing Y = y ∈ Y becomes 0.5 when ǫ = ln(|X | − 1) and Pr(X = x) is uniform).
B.5 RLDP of the restricted RAPPOR
Next we prove that the restricted RAPPOR provides RLDP as follows. Proposition 6. The (XS, θ,ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR provides (XS, YS, ǫ)-RLDP, where YS is given by (9) .
Proof. Let i, i ′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |X |}.
It follows from (12) that if xi ∈ XS, then y |X S |+1 = · · · = y |X | = 0. Therefore, there is no transitions from XS to YN , hence the (XS, θ, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR satisfies (4) . To show that the (XS, θ, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR satisfies (5), we first prove a few claims as follows.
Let y ∈ YS. If i = i ′ then QrRAP (y|xi) = QrRAP (y|x i ′ ) obviously. Thus, we assume i = i ′ hereafter.
Then we obtain the following claim: for any j = i, i ′ ,
This claim is proven as follows: If 1 ≤ j ≤ |XS| and yj = 1, then
Otherwise, since |XS| + 1 ≤ j ≤ |X | and y ∈ YS, we have yj = 0, hence Pr(y j |x i ) Pr(y j |x i ′ ) = 1 1 = 1. Now we show that the (XS, θ, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR satisfies (5) as follows.
If xi, x i ′ ∈ XS, then it follows from (11) that the (XS, θ, ǫ)restricted RAPPOR is equivalent to the (θ, ǫ)-RAPPOR in XS and YS, and thus satisfies (5).
Next we consider the case in which xi ∈ XS and x i ′ ∈ XN (i.e., 1 ≤ i ≤ |XS| and |XS| + 1 ≤ i ′ ≤ |X |). By x i ′ ∈ XN and y ∈ YS, we have y i ′ = 0. If yi = 1 then we have: (11), (12) , and (29))
hence (5) is satisfied. If yi = 0 then we obtain: (11), (12) , and (29))
which also imply (5) .
Finally we consider the case where xi, x i ′ ∈ XN (i.e., |XS| + 1 ≤ i, i ′ ≤ |X |). By xi, x i ′ ∈ XN and y ∈ YS, we have yi = y i ′ = 0. Then: (11), (12) , and (29)) = 1.
Therefore, the (XS, θ, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR provides (XS, YS, ǫ)-RLDP.
C. L1 LOSS OF THE RESTRICTED MECH-ANISMS
In this section we show the detailed analyses on the l1 loss of the restricted RR and the restricted RAPPOR. Table 3 summarizes the l1 loss of each obfuscation mechanism.
C.1 l1 loss of the restricted RR
We first present the l1 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RR. In the theoretical analysis of utility, we use the empirical estimation method described in Section 2.5. Then it follows from (7) and (8) that the distribution m of the obfuscated data can be written as follows:
The empirical estimate of p is given by:
The following proposition is derived from (30) and (31):
Proof. Let t be a frequency distribution of the obfuscated data with sample size n; i.e., t(x) =m(x)n. By ǫ > 0, we have u > 0 and v > 0. By (30) and (31), the l1 loss ofp can be written as follows:
It follows from the central limit theorem that t(x)−Et(x) √ n converges to the normal distribution N (0, m(x)(1 − m(x))) as n → ∞. Here we use the fact that the absolute moment of a random variable G ∼ N (µ, σ) is given by:
where Φ is Kummer's confluent hypergeometric function.
(See [48] for details.) Hence we obtain:
Then we have:
Recall that u = |XS| + e ǫ − 1, u ′ = e ǫ − 1, and v = u u ′ . It follows from (30) that for x ∈ XS, m(x) = p(x)/v + 1/u, Table 3 : l1 loss of each obfuscation mechanism in the worst case (RR: randomized response, RAP: RAPPOR, rRR: restricted RR, rRAP: restricted RAPPOR, no privacy: non-private mechanism, *1: approximation in the case where |XS| ≪ |X |).
Mechanism
and for x ∈ XN , m(x) = p(x)/v. Therefore, we obtain:
C.1.1 Maximum of the l1 loss
Next we show that when 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN | + 1), the l1 loss is maximized by the uniform distribution pU N over XN .
Here we do not present the general result for |XS| > |XN |, because in this section later, we are interested in using this proposition to analyze the utility for |X | ≫ |XS|, where the restricted mechanism is useful.
To prove these propositions, we first show the lemma below.
. For w ∈ [0, 1], we define A(w), B(w), and F (w) by:
Then for any 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN | + 1), F (w) is decreasing in w.
Proof. Let 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN | + 1) and w ∈ [0, 1). By ǫ > 0,
Let Cw = min 2 A(w), 2 B(w) . By Cw > 0, we obtain:
Recall that u ′ = e ǫ − 1. By e ǫ < |XN | + 1, we have:
Now we prove Proposition 8 as follows.
Proof. Let 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN | + 1). Let CSN be the set of all distributions p * over X that satisfy:
• for any x ∈ XS, p * (x) = p * (X S ) |X S | , and • for any x ∈ XN , p * (x) = p * (X N )
Note that CSN is the set of mixture distributions of the uniform distribution pU S over XS and the uniform distribution pU N over XN .
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, for any a1, a2, . . . , aL
where the equality holds iff a1 = a2 = . . . = aL. Hence by (13) we obtain:
where ≈ holds iff p ∈ CSN . Therefore we obtain:
where F is defined in Lemma 1. Note that in (34) , ≈ holds iff p ∈ CSN . By Lemma 1 and 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN | + 1), F (p(XS)) is maximized when p(XS) = 0. Hence the right-hand side of (13) is maximized when p(XS) = 0 and p ∈ CSN , i.e., when p is the uniform distribution pU N over XN .
Therefore we obtain:
Finally, we show that when ǫ ≥ ln(|XN | + 1), the l1 loss is maximized by a mixture of the uniform distribution pU S over XS and the uniform distribution pU N over XN . Proposition 9. Let p * be a distribution over X defined by:
Proof. We show that for any ǫ ≥ ln(|XN | + 1), the righthand side of (13) is maximized when p = p * . (Note that by ǫ ≥ ln(|XN | + 1), p * (x) ≥ 0 holds for all x ∈ X .) To show this, we prove that if p = p * then m is the uniform distribution over Y as follows. If x ∈ XS then we have:
On the other hand, if x ∈ XN then we obtain:
Hence m is the uniform distribution over Y.
By (33) and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we obtain:
where ≈ holds iff m is the uniform distribution over Y, or equivalently p = p * . Hence:
C.1.2 l1 loss in the high privacy regime
Consider the high privacy regime where ǫ ≈ 0. In this case, e ǫ − 1 ≈ ǫ. By using this approximation, we simplify the l1 loss of the restricted RR for both the cases where |XS| ≤ |XN | and where |XS| > |XN |.
Case 1: |XS| ≤ |XN |. By Proposition 8, the expected l1 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RR mechanism is maximized by pU N and given by:
Case 2: |XS| > |XN |. Let F be the function defined in Lemma 1, w * = argmax w∈[0,1] F (w), and p * be the prior distribution over X defined by:
Then, by (35) , E [l1(p, p)] is maximized by p * . Thus, for ǫ ≈ 0, the expected l1 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RR mechanism is given by:
In summary, the expected l1 loss of the restricted RR is at most
in the high privacy regime, irrespective of whether |XS| ≤ |XN | or not. It is shown in [24] that the expected l1 loss of the ǫ-RR is at most
when ǫ ≈ 0. Thus, the expected l1 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RR is much smaller than that of the ǫ-RR when |XS| ≪ |X |.
C.1.3 l1 loss in the low privacy regime
Consider the low privacy regime where ǫ = ln |X | and |XS| ≪ |X |. By Proposition 9, the expected l1 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RR is given by:
It should be noted that the expected l1 loss of the nonprivate mechanism, which does not obfuscate the personal data, is at most 2(|X |−1) nπ [24] . Thus, when ǫ = ln |X | and |XS| ≪ |X |, the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RR achieves almost the same data utility as the non-private mechanism, whereas the expected l1 loss of the ǫ-RR is twice larger than that of the non-private mechanism [24] .
C.2 l1 loss of the restricted RAPPOR
We first present the l1 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RAP-POR. Recall that mj (resp.mj) is the true probability (resp. empirical probability) that the j-th coordinate in obfuscated data is 1. It follows from (10), (11) and (12) that mj can be written as follows:
Then, the empirical estimatep is given by:
The following proposition is derived from (36) and (37):
Proof. Let vS = e ǫ/2 +1 e ǫ/2 −1 . By ǫ > 0, we have vS > 0 and vN > 0.
Analogously to the derivation of (33) in Appendix C.1, it follows from (36) and (37) that:
Let u = e ǫ/2 + 1. Then vS = u u ′ and vN = u−1 u ′ . It follows from (36) that for 1 ≤ j ≤ |XS|, mj = p(xj)/vS + 1/u, and for |XS| + 1 ≤ j ≤ |X |, mj = p(xj)/vN . Therefore, we obtain:
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C.2.1 Maximum of the l1 loss
Next we show that when 0 < ǫ < 2 ln( |X N | 2 + 1), the l1 loss is maximized by the uniform distribution pU N over XN .
To prove this proposition, we first show the lemma below.
Lemma 2. Assume 1 ≤ |XS| ≤ |XN |. Let u ′ = e ǫ/2 − 1 and vn = e ǫ/2 e ǫ/2 −1 . For w ∈ [0, 1], we define A(w), B(w), and F (w) by:
Then for any 0 < ǫ < 2 ln( |X N | 2 + 1), F (w) is decreasing in w.
Proof. Let 0 < ǫ < 2 ln( |X N | 2 + 1) and w ∈ [0, 1). By ǫ > 0, |XS| ≥ 1, and vn = e ǫ/2 e ǫ/2 −1 > 1, we have A(w) > 0 and B(w) > 0. Then:
Recall that u ′ = e ǫ/2 − 1. By ǫ < 2 ln |X N | 2 + 1 , we have e ǫ/2 < |X N | 2 + 1, hence:
Hence dF (w) dw < 0. Therefore for w ∈ [0, 1), F (w) is decreasing in w.
Now we prove Proposition 11 as follows.
Proof. Let 0 < ǫ < 2 ln |X N | 2 + 1 . As with the proof for Proposition 8, let CSN be the set of all distributions p * over X that satisfy:
• for any 1 ≤ j ≤ |XS|, p * (xj) = p * (X S ) |X S | , and • for any |XS| + 1 ≤ j ≤ |X |, p * (xj) = p * (X N )
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, for any a1, a2, . . . , aL ≥ 0,
where the equality holds iff a1 = a2 = . . . = aL. Hence by (18) we obtain:
where the equality holds iff p ∈ CSN . Therefore we obtain:
where F is defined in Lemma 2. Note that in (38) , ≈ holds iff p ∈ CSN . By Lemma 2 and 0 < ǫ < 2 ln( |X N | 2 + 1), F (p(XS)) is maximized when p(XS) = 0. Hence the right-hand side of (18) is maximized when p(XS) = 0 and p ∈ CSN , i.e., when p is the uniform distribution pU N over XN .
C.2.2 l1 loss in the high privacy regime
Consider the high privacy regime where ǫ ≈ 0. In this case, e ǫ/2 − 1 ≈ ǫ/2. By using this approximation, we simplify the l1 loss of the restricted RAPPOR for both the cases where |XS| ≤ |XN | and where |XS| > |XN |.
Case 1: |XS| ≤ |XN |. By Proposition 11, the expected l1 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR mechanism is given by:
Case 2: |XS| > |XN |. Let F be the function defined in Lemma 2, w * = argmax w∈[0,1] F (w), and p * be the prior distribution over X defined by:
Then, by (39) , E [l1(p, p)] is maximized by p * . Thus, for ǫ ≈ 0, the expected l1 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR mechanism is given by:
In summary, the expected l1 loss of the restricted RAP-POR is at most 2 nπ · 2|X S | ǫ in the high privacy regime, irrespective of whether |XS| ≤ |XN | or not. It is shown in [24] that the expected l1 loss of the ǫ-RAPPOR is at most 2 nπ · 2|X | ǫ when ǫ ≈ 0. Thus, the expected l1 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR is much smaller than that of the ǫ-RAPPOR when |XS| ≪ |X |.
Note that the expected l1 loss of the restricted RAPPOR in the worst case can also be expressed as Θ( |X S | √ nǫ 2 ) in this case. In Appendix F, we also prove that this is "order" optimal among all OSLDP mechanisms.
C.2.3 l1 loss in the low privacy regime
Consider the low privacy regime where ǫ = ln |X | and |XS| ≪ |X |. In this case, we have ǫ = ln |X | < 2 ln( |X N | 2 + 1) (since |X | < ( |X N | 2 + 1) 2 ). Then by Proposition 11, the expected l1 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR mechanism is given by: .
(by |X | ≫ 1) (40) When |XS| ≪ |X | 3 4 , the right-hand side of (40) can be simplified as follows:
Note that the expected l1 loss of the non-private mechanism is at most 2(|X |−1) nπ [24] . Thus, when ǫ = ln |X | and |XS| ≪ |X | 3 4 , the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR achieves almost the same data utility as the non-private mechanism, whereas the expected l1 loss of the ǫ-RAPPOR is |X | times larger than that of the non-private mechanism [24] .
D. L2 LOSS OF THE RESTRICTED MECH-ANISMS
In this section we theoretically analyze the l2 loss of the restricted RR and the restricted RAPPOR. We also show the results of the MSE in our experiments.
D.1 l2 loss of the restricted RR
We first present the l2-loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RR.
Proposition 15 (l2-loss of the restricted RR). The expected l2-loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RR mechanism is given by:
Proof. Let u = |XS| + e ǫ − 1, u ′ = e ǫ − 1, and v = u u ′ . By ǫ > 0, we have u > 0 and v > 0.
Let t be a frequency distribution of the obfuscated data Y ; i.e., t(x) =m(x)n. Since t(x) follows the binomial distribution with parameters n and m(x), the mean is given Table 4 : l2 loss of each obfuscation mechanism in the worst case (RR: randomized response, RAP: RAPPOR, rRR: restricted RR, rRAP: restricted RAPPOR, no privacy: non-private mechanism, *1: approximation in the case where |XS| ≪ |X |).
, and the variance of t(x) is given by
Then, by (30) and (31), the l2-loss ofp can be written as follows:
It follows from (30) that for x ∈ XS, m(x) = p(x)/v+1/u, and for x ∈ XN , m(x) = p(x)/v. Therefore, we obtain:
n(e ǫ −1) 2
D.1.1 Maximum of the l2 loss
Next we show that when 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN | + 1), the l2 loss is maximized by the uniform distribution pU N over XN .
Proposition 16. For any 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN | + 1), the righthand side of (41) is maximized by the uniform distribution pU N over XN :
To show this proposition, we first show the following lemma.
Proof. Let 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN | + 1) and w ∈ [0, 1]. Then e ǫ − 1 < |XN |.
Now we prove Proposition 16 as follows.
. By (41), we have:
Let CSN be the set of distributions p * over X such that:
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By the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means, we obtain:
where the equality holds iff for all x ∈ XS, p(x) = p(X S ) |X S | . An analogous inequality holds for XN . Therefore we obtain:
where the equality holds iff p ∈ CSN . Hence we obtain:
where F is defined in Lemma 3, and the equality holds iff p ∈ CSN . By Lemma 3 and 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN | + 1), F (p(XS)) is maximized when p(XS) = 0. Therefore E l 2 2 (p, p) is maximized when p(XS) = 0 and p ∈ CSN , i.e., when p is the uniform distribution pU N over XN .
Next, we show that when ǫ ≥ ln(|XN | + 1), the l2 loss is maximized by a mixture of the uniform distribution pU S over XS and the uniform distribution pU N over XN .
Proposition 17. Let p * be a distribution over X defined by:
Then for any ǫ ≥ ln(|XN | + 1), the right-hand side of (41) is maximized by p * :
Proof. We show that for any ǫ ≥ ln(|XN | + 1), the righthand side of (41) is maximized when p = p * . (Note that by ǫ ≥ ln(|XN | + 1), p * (x) ≥ 0 holds for all x ∈ X .) To show this, we recall that if p = p * then m is the uniform distribution over Y, as shown in the proof for Proposition9.
Let v = |X S |+e ǫ −1 e ǫ −1 . By (42) and the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means, we obtain:
where the equality holds iff m is the uniform distribution over X . Hence:
D.1.2 l2 loss in the high privacy regime
Consider the high privacy regime where ǫ ≈ 0. In this case, e ǫ − 1 ≈ ǫ. By using this approximation, we simplify the l2 loss of the restricted RR.
By Proposition 16, the expected l2 loss of the (XS, ǫ)restricted RR mechanism is maximized by pU N :
(by e ǫ − 1 ≈ ǫ)
It is shown in [24] that the expected l2 loss of the ǫ-RR is at most |X |(|X |−1)
when ǫ ≈ 0. Thus, the expected l2 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RR is much smaller than that of the ǫ-RR when |XS| ≪ |X |.
D.1.3 l2 loss in the low privacy regime
Consider the low privacy regime where ǫ = ln |X | and |XS| ≪ |X |. By Proposition 17, the expected l 2 2 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RR is given by:
(by 1/|X | ≈ 0 and |XS|/|X | ≈ 0)
It should be noted that the expected l2 loss of the nonprivate mechanism is at most 1 n (1− 1 |X | ) [24] , and that 1 n (1− 1 |X | ) ≈ 1 n when |X | ≫ 1. Thus, when ǫ = ln |X | and |XS| ≪ |X |, the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RR achieves almost the same data utility as the non-private mechanism, whereas the expected l1 loss of the ǫ-RR is four times larger than that of the nonprivate mechanism [24] .
D.2 l2 loss of the restricted RAPPOR
We first present the l2 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RAP-POR. Recall that mj (resp.mj) is the true probability (resp. empirical probability) that the j-th coordinate in obfuscated data is 1.
Proposition 18 (l2 loss of the restricted RAPPOR). Then the expected l2-loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR mechanism is given by:
Proof. Let vS = e ǫ/2 +1 e ǫ/2 −1 , and vN = e ǫ/2 e ǫ/2 −1 . By ǫ > 0, we have vS > 0 and vN > 0.
For each 1 ≤ j ≤ |X |, let tj be the number of users whose j-th coordinate in the obfuscated data is 1; i.e., tj =mjn. Since tj follows the binomial distribution with parameters n and mj , the mean is given by E[tj ] = nmj, and the variance of tj is given by Var(tj) = nmj(1 − mj).
Then, by (36) and (37), the l2-loss ofp can be written as follows:
Let u = e ǫ/2 + 1 and u ′ = e ǫ/2 − 1. Then vS = u u ′ and vN = u−1 u ′ . It follows from (36) that for 1 ≤ j ≤ |XS|, mj = p(xj )/vS +1/u, and for |XS|+1 ≤ j ≤ |X |, mj = p(xj)/vN . Therefore, we obtain:
D.2.1 Maximum of the l2 loss
Next we show that for any 0 < ǫ < 2 ln( |X N | 2 + 1), the l2 loss is maximized by the uniform distribution pU N over XN .
Proposition 19. For any 0 < ǫ < 2 ln( |X N | 2 +1), the l2-loss E l 2 2 (p, p) is maximized when p = pU N :
Lemma 4. For w ∈ [0, 1], we define F (w) by:
For any 0 < ǫ < 2 ln( |X N | 2 + 1), F (w) is decreasing in w.
by ǫ < 2 ln( |X N | 2 + 1) and w ≥ 0 Therefore, F (w) is decreasing in w.
Now we prove Proposition 19 as follows.
Proof. Let M = 1 + (|X S |+1)e ǫ/2 −1 (e ǫ/2 −1) 2
. By Proposition 18, we have:
As with the proof for Proposition 16, let CSN be the set of all distributions p * over X that satisfy:
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where the equality holds iff for all 1 ≤ j ≤ |XS|, p(xj) = p(X S ) |X S | . An analogous inequality holds for XN . Therefore we obtain:
where F is defined in Lemma 4, and the equality holds iff p ∈ CSN . By Lemma 4 and 0 < ǫ < 2 ln( |X N | 2 + 1), F (p(XS)) is maximized when p(XS) = 0. Therefore, E l 2 2 (p, p) is maximized when p(XS) = 0 and p ∈ CSN , i.e., when p is the uniform distribution pU N over XN .
D.2.2 l2 loss in the high privacy regime
Consider the high privacy regime where ǫ ≈ 0. In this case, e ǫ/2 − 1 ≈ ǫ/2. By using this approximation, we simplify the l2 loss of the restricted RAPPOR.
By Proposition 19, the expected l2 loss of the (XS, ǫ)restricted RAPPOR mechanism is given by:
(by e ǫ/2 − 1 ≈ ǫ/2)
Thus, the expected l2 loss of the restricted RAPPOR is at most 4|X S | nǫ 2 in the high privacy regime. It is shown in [24] that the expected l2 loss of the ǫ-RAPPOR is at most 4|X | nǫ 2 (1 − 1 |X | ) when ǫ ≈ 0. Thus, the expected l2 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR is much smaller than that of the ǫ-RAPPOR when |XS| ≪ |X |.
Note that the expected l2 loss of the restricted RAPPOR in the worst case can also be expressed as Θ( |X S | nǫ 2 ) in this case. In Appendix F, we also prove that this is "order" optimal among all OSLDP mechanisms.
D.2.3 l2 loss in the low privacy regime
Consider the low privacy regime where ǫ = ln |X | and |XS| ≪ |X |. By Proposition 19, the expected l2 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR mechanism is given by:
When |XS| ≪ |X |, the right side of (46) is simplified as:
Note that the expected l2 loss of the non-private mechanism is at most 1 n (1 − 1 |X | ) [24] , and that 1 n (1 − 1 |X | ) ≈ 1 n when |X | ≫ 1. Thus, when ǫ = ln |X | and |XS| ≪ |X |, the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR achieves almost the same data utility as the non-private mechanism, whereas the expected l2 loss of the ǫ-RAPPOR is |X | times larger than that of the non-private mechanism [24] . Fig. 11, 12, 13, and 14 show the results of the MSE corresponding to Fig. 5, 6 , 7, and 8, respectively. It can be seen that a tendency similar to the results of the TV is obtained for the results of the MSE, meaning that our proposed methods are effective in terms of both the l1 and l2 losses.
D.3 Experimental Results of the MSE
E. PROPERTIES OF PERSONALIZED RE-STRICTED MECHANISMS
E.1 Privacy Analysis of PRMs
Below we show the proof of Proposition 12.
Proof. Sensitive data x ∈ XS ∪X (i) S for the i-th user is always mapped to z ∈ ZS, since f (i) pre deterministically maps x ∈ X (i) S to ⊥ k for some k = 1, · · · , κ (see (21) ). Then, z ∈ ZS is always mapped to y ∈ YS thanks to the property of the restricted mechanism Qcmn. Therefore, the output set corresponding to XS ∪ X (i) S is restricted to YS, and (4) holds for any x ∈ XS ∪ X (i) S and y ∈ YN . In addition, (5) holds for any z, z ′ ∈ Z and any y ∈ Y, since Qcmn provides (ZS, YS, ǫ)-RLDP. Let Z (i) be a random variable representing intermediate data of the i-th user. Then, Pr(
S . Thus, (5) holds for any x, x ′ ∈ X and any y ∈ Y.
E.2 Utility Analysis of PRMs
Below we show the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (l1 loss of the PRM).
Proof. Letp * be the estimate of p in the case where the exact distribution π k is known to the analyst; i.e.,π k = π k for any k = 1, · · · , κ. Then the l1 loss ofp can be written, using the triangle inequality, as follows:
Since π k (x) is the conditional probability that the personal data is x ∈ X given that the intermediate data is z = ⊥ k , we have
In addition, by substitutingp * and π k forp andπ k in (23), respectively, we havê
By (48) and (49), an upper bound of l1(p * , p) is given by: 
By (23) and (49), l1(p,p * ) is written as follows:
By (47), (50) , and (51), the inequality (24) holds.
F. OPTIMALITY OF THE RLDP MECHA-NISMS
F.1 Optimality of the RLDP mechanism in the binary case
Below we show the proof of Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Let ǫ > 0. If p(1) < 1, the mechanism Q defined above with parameters q0 = e −ǫ and q1 = 1 uniquely minimizes the l1 loss for a sufficiently large n and the l2 loss for any n among all mechanisms providing (XS, ǫ)-OSLDP.
Proof. Let q2 = q1 +e ǫ (1−q0). Then by (6), (XS, ǫ)-OSLDP satisfies 1−e ǫ (1−q0) ≤ q1 ≤ e ǫ q0, hence 1 ≤ q2 ≤ e ǫ . Recall that we assume 0.5 ≤ q1 ≤ 1 without loss of generality. By ǫ > 0, we obtain q0 = q1 and q2 = (1 − e ǫ )q1 + e ǫ . Thus, (XS, ǫ)-OSLDP can be expressed as the set of mechanisms that satisfy: 0.5 ≤ q1 ≤ 1, 1 ≤ q2 ≤ e ǫ , q2 = (1 − e ǫ )q1 + e ǫ .
Let D1 = {(q1, q2) | 0.5 ≤ q1 ≤ 1, 1 ≤ q2 ≤ e ǫ , q2 < (1 − e ǫ )q1 + e ǫ } and D2 = {(q1, q2) | 0.5 ≤ q1 ≤ 1, 1 ≤ q2 ≤ e ǫ , q2 > (1 − e ǫ )q1 + e ǫ }. Figure 15 shows the space of (q1, q2) providing (XS, ǫ)-OSLDP, which can be partitioned into D1 and D2. The distribution m of the obfuscated data can be written as follows: m(1) = p(1)q1 + (1 − p(1))q0 m(0) = 1 − m(1).
Thus, the empirical estimate of p is given by:
Let t be a frequency distribution of the obfuscated data with sample size n; i.e., t(1) =m(1)n and t(0) =m(0)n. Then, by (53) and (54), the expected l1 loss can be written as follows:
It follows from the central limit theorem that t(1)−Et(1) √ n converges to the normal distribution N (0, m(1)(1 − m(1))) as n → ∞. Then the expectation of t(1)−Et(1) √ n can be expressed, in the same way as (32), as follows: m(1) ).
Thus, the expected l1 loss can be expressed by:
By the definition of q2, we have q0 = 1 − (q2 − q1)e −ǫ . Hence we obtain:
Analogously, the expected l2 loss can be written as follows:
2Var[t(1)] n 2 (q1 − q0) 2 = 2m(1)(1 − m(1)) n(q1 − q0) 2 = 2m(1)(1 − m(1)) n((1 − e −ǫ )q1 + e −ǫ q2 − 1) 2 .
(56)
We now define H(q1, q2) by:
By (55), (56), and (57), a pair of parameters (q1, q2) that minimizes H(q1, q2) also minimizes the l1 and l2 losses. Below we show that (q1, q2) = (1, e ǫ ) is a unique minimizer of the l1 and l2 losses by showing Lemmas 5 and 6:
Lemma 5. Assume that ǫ > 0 and p(1) < 1. If (q1, q2) ∈ D2, then ∂H(q1, q2) ∂q1 < 0 (58)
If (q1, q2) ∈ D1, then ∂H(q1, q2) ∂q2 > 0. (60)
Proof. We introduce some notations as follows. Let m1 = m(1) and p1 = p(1). Since q0 = 1 − (q2 − q1)e −ǫ , m1 in (53) can be expressed by:
We also define a by:
Then H(q1, q2) in (57) can be written as follows:
We first show (58). Assume that (q1, q2) ∈ D2. We define z1 by:
Then by (62), we obtain:
Thus by (63) and (64), we have:
It should be noted that in (66), we have 0.5z1 ≤ m1 ≤ 1, 0 < z1 < 1, and 0 < a ≤ 1 − e −ǫ . This can be shown as follows. First, by (q1, q2) ∈ D2, we have 0.5 ≤ q1 ≤ 1 and 0.5e −ǫ ≤ q0 ≤ 1, hence it follows from (62) that 0.5z1 ≤ m1 ≤ 1. Second, by (65) and the assumptions 0 ≤ p1 < 1 and ǫ > 0, we obtain 0 < z1 < 1. Finally, by (q1, q2) ∈ D2, we have q2 > (1 − e ǫ )q1 + e ǫ , q1 ≤ 1, and q2 ≤ e ǫ , hence it follows from (63) that 0 < a ≤ 1 − e −ǫ . Therefore, if 0.5 ≤ m1 ≤ 1, then ∂H(q1, q2)/∂q1 < 0 follows from (66).
If 0.5z1 ≤ m1 < 0.5, then (1 − 2m1)z1a > 0. Thus, by a ≤ 1 − e −ǫ , the numerator of (66) is written as:
Note that (67) is quadratic in m1, and that 1 − e ǫ > 0 since ǫ > 0. If m1 = 0.5z1, then 2m 2 1 − 2(z1 + 1)m1 + z1 = − z 2 1 2 < 0.
If m1 = 0.5, then 2m 2 1 − 2(z1 + 1)m1 + z1 = − 1 2 < 0.
Thus, for any m1 such that 0.5z1 ≤ m1 < 0.5, the righthand side of (67) is negative, hence ∂H(q 1 ,q 2 ) ∂q 1 < 0. Therefore, (58) holds. 29 We then show (59). Assume that (q1, q2) ∈ D2. We define z2 by:
By the assumptions 0 ≤ p1 < 1 and ǫ > 0, we obtain −1 < z2 < 0. By (62) and (68), we have:
Then by (63) and (64), we obtain:
If q1 = 1, then m1 in (62) and a in (63) can be written as m1 = 1−(1−p1)(q2 −1)e −ǫ and a = e −ǫ (q2−1), respectively. By (q1, q2) ∈ D2, we have q2 > 1 and thus a > 0. Then, the numerator of (69) can be written as follows:
(by (68)) = z2a < 0.
Thus, (69) is negative for q1 = 1. Therefore (59) holds.
Finally, we show (60). Assume that (q1, q2) ∈ D1. By q2 < (1 − e ǫ )q1 + e ǫ and (63), we obtain a < 0. In addition, since 1 − (q2 − q1)e −ǫ > q1 in this case, m1 in (62) can be written as m1 > q1 = 0.5. Furthermore, we have m1 ≤ 1, since m1 (= m(1)) is a probability. By 0.5 < m1 ≤ 1, z2 < 0, and a < 0, both the numerator and denominator of (69) are negative. Therefore (60) holds. Lemma 6. Assume that ǫ > 0 and p(1) < 1. For any q1 such that 0.5 ≤ q1 < 1, H(q1, 1) > H(1, e ǫ ).
Proof. We first define µ1 and µ2 by:
By (57) and (62), we have:
It should be noted that:
and therefore, µ1 = µ2(q1 − 1) + 1.
Then, the numerator of (71) can be written as follows:
− (µ2(q1 − 1) + 1)µ2(q1 − 1) − µ2(1 − µ2)(q1 − 1) 2 = −µ2(q1 − 1)q1.
By (70), p1 < 1 and ǫ > 0, we have 0 < µ2 < 1. Thus, by 0.5 ≤ q1 < 1, (72) is positive. Therefore H(q1, 1) > H(1, e ǫ ) holds.
Now we prove Proposition 4 from Lemmas 5 and 6. First it follows from Lemma 5 that a minimizer of H lies at (q1, 1) for 0.5 ≤ q1 < 1 (i.e., the left edge of D1) or (1, e ǫ ) (i.e., the upper right corner of D2). Then it follows from Lemma 6 that (q1, q2) = (1, e ǫ ) is a unique minimizer of H. Therefore, (q1, q2) = (1, e ǫ ) is a unique minimizer of the l1 and l2 losses.
F.2 Optimality of the restricted RAPPOR
In Appendices C.2.2 and D.2.2, we showed that the l1 and l2 losses of the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR in the worst case can be expressed as Θ( |X S | √ nǫ 2 ) and Θ( |X S | nǫ 2 ), respectively, in the high privacy regime where ǫ is close to 0.
We show that under both the l1 and l2 losses, the restricted RAPPOR is "order" optimal among all obfuscation mechanisms providing OSLDP. Specifically, Duchi et al. [17] showed the lower bound on the l1 and l2 losses of any ǫ-LDP mechanism. By directly applying this lower bound, we bound the l1 and l2 losses of any (XS, ǫ)-OSLDP mechanisms.
Let nS (≤ n) be the number of users who have sensitive data, and YS (⊆ Y ) be a tuple of their obfuscated data. We assume that the summation of the probability p(x) over XS is positive and so is nS (i.e., x∈X S p(x) > 0, nS > 0). Then we consider a problem that the data collector who obtains YS estimates a probability distribution pS of sensitive data x ∈ XS of the following form:
pS is a probability distribution over XS; i.e., x∈X S pS(x) = 1, pS(x) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ XS. LetpS be the estimate of pS.
In the following, we consider a loss function l defined over XS.
Let DX S ,ǫ be the set of all obfuscation mechanisms Q providing (XS, ǫ)-OSLDP. For a fixed loss function l, we consider the following optimization problem: r l,X S ,ǫ = inf Q∈D X S ,ǫ r l (Q),
where r l (Q) = inf
In (75), the supremum (i.e., worst case) is taken over all distributions pS and the infimum (i.e., best case) is taken over all estimatespS. r l (Q) is called the minimax risk [42] . For the l1 and l2 losses, we can bound the minimax risk of any (XS, ǫ)-OSLDP mechanism when ǫ ∈ [0, 1]: Proposition 20. For any (XS, ǫ)-OSLDP mechanism, there exists a universal constant 0 < α l ≤ αu < 5 such that for all ǫ ∈ [0, 1], α l min 1, |XS| √ nSǫ 2 ≤ r l 1 ,X S ,ǫ ≤ αu min 1, |XS| √ nSǫ 2 (76) α l min 1, 1 √ nSǫ 2 , |XS| nSǫ 2 ≤ r l 2 2 ,X S ,ǫ ≤ αu min 1, |XS| nSǫ 2 .
Proof. By Definition 3, an obfuscation mechanism Q providing (XS, ǫ)-OSLDP satisfies Q(y|x) ≤ e ǫ Q(y|x ′ ) (78)
for any x, x ′ ∈ XS and y ∈ Y. In other words, (XS, ǫ)-OSLDP provides ǫ-LDP for any pair of sensitive data x, x ′ ∈ XS. Since YS is generated from sensitive data, the problem of estimating pS from YS is equivalent to the problem of estimating a distribution from data obfuscated using an ǫ-LDP mechanism. Then, we obtain (76) and (77) by directly applying the lower bound on the l1 and l2 losses of any ǫ-LDP mechanism in [17] (see their Proposition 6) .
Proposition 20 means that for large n, the lower bound on the l1 and l2 losses ofpS can be expressed as Θ( |X S | √ nǫ 2 ) and Θ( |X S | nǫ 2 ), respectively (since nS = Θ(n)). Now we return to the problem of estimating a distribution p from Y . For this problem, even if the data collector perfectly extracts YS from Y , the lower bound on the l1 and l2 losses ofp over XS can be expressed as Θ( |X S | √ nǫ 2 ) and Θ( |X S | nǫ 2 ), respectively (note that Y \ YS is not related to pS, and pS(x) is proportional to p(x) for x ∈ XS (see (73))). In addition, there are the l1 and l2 losses ofp over XN . Therefore, the lower bound on the l1 and l2 losses ofp is Θ( |X S | √ nǫ 2 ) and Θ( |X S | nǫ 2 ), respectively, both of which are achieved by the (XS, ǫ)-restricted RAPPOR.
